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Vecchi: Repulsed by RAP?

REPULSED BY RAP? RENEWAL OPTIONS ARE SINGING A
DIFFERENT TUNE:
AN ANALYSIS OF BLEECKER STREET TENANTS CORP. V.
BLEEKER JONES, LLC
Jonathan M. Vecchi*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Bleecker Street Tenants Corp. v. Bleeker Jones LLC, 1 the
New York Court of Appeals held that options to renew in a lease, regardless of duration, are not subject to New York‟s statutory Rule
Against Perpetuities (hereinafter “RAP”).2 Never before had the
Court of Appeals fully exempted an entire interest from the grasp of
RAP.3 Even so, Bleecker Street is the third substantial decision by
New York‟s highest court to hinder RAP‟s ability to void land interests.4
An analysis of Bleecker Street requires an evaluation of RAP
at common law, in the New York statutes, and in the New York
Court of Appeal‟s rulings, which have previously limited the current
statutory interpretation.5 This Comment analyzes the court‟s reason*

J.D. Candidate 2013, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg School of Law; B.B.A. 2010,
Hofstra University. I would like to thank Professor Seplowitz for the inspiration to pursue
this subject and for her guidance throughout the writing process. I also want to thank my
mother and grandmother for their continued love and support throughout my life; all of my
successes are due to their constant encouragement.
1
945 N.E.2d 484 (N.Y. 2011).
2
Id. at 487.
3
See Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola Props., Inc., 669 N.E.2d 799, 805 (N.Y. 1996)
(stating that in limited circumstances of preemptive rights, “enforcement [of the right] would
promote the purposes underlying [RAP]”).
4
The other two cases are Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 806 (holding that the appurtenant exemption to RAP applied to purchase options) and Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Bruken Realty Corp., 492 N.E.2d 379, 385 (N.Y. 1986) (holding RAP does not apply to commercial and governmental preemptive rights).
5
See, e.g., Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 806 (stating that the appurtenant exemption could save certain purchase options even if they would otherwise vest beyond the statu-
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ing for exempting the entirety of lease renewal options from RAP as
opposed to extending previously created doctrines. Furthermore, this
Comment suggests a different reasoning that the majority could have
used to quell the criticisms of the concurring and dissenting opinions.
Part II discusses the history of RAP, its common law purposes, and
New York‟s statutory adoption of the rule. Part III examines two
previous New York Court of Appeals cases which limited RAP‟s application to contingent rights. Part IV reviews the treatment of renewal options by New York courts before the Bleecker Street decision. Part V examines the reasoning of the majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions of Bleecker Street. Part VI analyzes the Bleecker
Street decision‟s consistency with other New York Court of Appeals
opinions, the effects of the case on landlords and tenants, addresses
the concerns of the concurring and dissenting opinions, and suggests
an alternative approach the majority could have taken to reach the
same conclusion while alleviating the concerns of the concurring and
dissenting judges. Part VII briefly concludes. The Bleecker Street
decision is the continuation of numerous changes to a common law
rule that is respected, feared, and criticized by the legal community.6
II.

HISTORY OF NEW YORK’S RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
A.

The Common Law Rule Emerges

As King Henry VIII of England lavished himself with the
pleasantries of the English Court, his financial problems grew along
with his waistline.7 To alleviate these financial woes, the King increasingly leaned on Parliament to find new and clever ways to sustain his lifestyle. For instance, in 1535, Parliament reluctantly passed
tory perpetuities period); Wildenstein & Co., Inc. v. Wallis, 595 N.E.2d 828, 834 (N.Y.
1992) (holding that RAP does not apply to personal property interests in commercial transactions); Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at 384 (finding preemptive rights in government and commercial
transactions are exempt from RAP).
6
Anderson v. 50 East 72nd St. Condo., 505 N.Y.S.2d 101, 106 (App. Div. 1986) (“[RAP]
is frequently viewed as a regressive relic of the dim and distant past, a principle to be
avoided or evaded, if at all possible.”); George L. Haskins, Extending the Grasp of the Dead
Hand: Reflections on the Origins of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 19, 20
(1977) (“The Rule Against Perpetuities is among the oldest, most respected, and difficult to
understand rules of the common law.”).
7
JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 190, 267 (7th ed. 2010).
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the Statute of Uses which had the outward appearance of preventing
land abuse from the previously required use of feoffees, but actually
was intended to provide additional taxation for the Crown. 8 While
the passage of the act led to much resistance, the King and Parliament
furthered their commitment to taxation by passing the Statute of
Wills in 1540.9 This act allowed landowners, for the first time, to devise their land to the people they chose at death.10 Of course, it also
allowed the property to escheat to the Crown if the decedent had no
living relatives.11
These two acts of Parliament caused many landholders to attempt to restrict alienability of their property by ensuring that property would remain in the family for generations after their deaths.12
What resulted were property interests that restricted ownership, marketability, and usage for present and future owners of property, potentially in perpetuity.13 Meanwhile, the English courts fought the
use of such restrictions as hindering the “free and ready transfer of
property.”14 Over the next few generations, the courts struck down
land transfers that were found to create a perpetuity;15 but, judges
constantly struggled to determine a bright line rule on what constituted a perpetuity.16 In 1681, a compromise was reached between
landholders and the courts in The Duke of Norfolk’s Case,17 which
created the rule against perpetuities.18 This rule was meant to promote the development and use of land while still allowing property
owners to retain some control for limited subsequent generations.19
At its founding, RAP was “a flexible balancing principle.”20
8

Id. at 267-68.
See Anderson, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 106 (stating that RAP “was a necessary response” to the
Statute of Wills).
10
JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 9 (8th ed. 2009).
11
State by Furman v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co., 178 A.2d 329, 336 (N.J. 1962) (stating
the revenue from escheat was well recognized in the statutes of wills).
12
Haskins, supra note 6, at 29.
13
Anderson, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 106.
14
Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at 381.
15
See Haskins, supra note 6, at 35 (“[T]he judges of the king‟s courts had been fighting
against perpetuities long before the first enunciation of [RAP].”).
16
See id. at 43.
17
(1681) 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch); 3 Chan. Cas. 1.
18
Anderson, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 106.
19
Wildenstein & Co., 595 N.E.2d at 832-33.
20
Id. at 833; Haskins, supra note 6, at 43 (stating a perpetuity under The Duke of Norfolk‟s Case was an interest that “would not last too long, and the test of „too long‟ became
9
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Early Developments of the New York Rule

As the common law rule developed, RAP became a much
more rigid formula and the validity of a property transfer was determined exclusively by a specific time limitation. Chancellor Kent, the
highest judge in New York at the time, stated the common law development best:
The courts of justice have . . . wisely and steadily determined that they would not permit [contingent interests] to tie up property beyond a moderate and reasonable period.
They have determined that the
contingency of an [interest] must happen within a life,
or lives in being, and twenty-one years afterwards.
This is the utmost length to which property can be so
tied up . . . and if it attempts to go beyond that limit, it
is void.21
The possibility that the estate may vest beyond the perpetuities period
voids the interest from its inception; “it is immaterial how the fact actually turns out.”22 New York pursued this common law rule, as developed by the courts following The Duke of Norfolk’s Case, until the
New York legislature altered the rule by statute.23
In 1830, the New York legislature passed a statute that substantially altered common law RAP as it applied within the state.24
The statute limited the drafter‟s control to two lives in being.25 Additionally, in regard to real property, a period of minority was utilized
to extend the statutory perpetuity limit if the holder of the remainder

whatever was inconveniently long”).
21
Anderson v. Jackson, 16 Johns. Ch. 382, 399 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819) (emphasis added).
Years later, Professor John Chipman Gray simplified the common law articulation of RAP as
“[n]o interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some
life in being at the creation of the interest.” John Chipman Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities at 166 (2d ed. 1906).
22
Anderson, 16 Johns. Ch. at 403.
23
See Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 803 (stating that New York created its first
statutory RAP law in 1830).
24
Purdy v. Hayt, 92 N.Y. 446, 450-51 (1883) (“[S]uccessive estates for life shall not be
limited unless to persons in being at creation thereof; and where a remainder shall be limited
on more than two successive estates for life all the life estates subsequent to those of the two
persons first entitled thereto shall be void.”) (quoting 1 R.S. 723, § 17).
25
Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 803; In re Wilcox, 87 N.E. 497, 499 (N.Y. 1909).
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interest was a minor.26 The legislative intent for such a unique
change was “to enact some further limitation on the power to create
future estates.”27 Interestingly, unlike the common law rule, the statutory rule limited the number of future interests that could be
created, and invalidated any subsequent interests regardless of
whether the interest holder was alive at the transfer or how long the
interest lasted.28 Furthermore, RAP did not apply to all interests, but
it did exclude all options.29 The statute was considered so unnecessarily complex and different from the common law rule that courts
found little logical connection between the two.30 Due to the statute‟s
very narrow scope, New York courts conceded that many transfers
that would have fallen under the common law rule were now free to
be created by grantors without repercussion.31
C.

The Current New York Law

After much criticism and confusion over the wording and
meaning of the statute, the New York legislature enacted a series of
revisions between 1958 and 1965.32 What resulted was a codified resurrection of common law RAP in New York which continues in
force today.33 The statute reads:
26

Greenland v. Waddell, 22 N.E. 367, 370 (N.Y. 1889) (finding a trust void for failure to
meet the two lives in being condition of RAP). See also Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d
at 803; In re Wilcox, 87 N.E. at 499 (stating that the statute discontinued the twenty-one year
period and replaced it with a minority period for real estate perpetuity determinations).
27
In re Wilcox, 87 N.E. at 500.
28
Purdy, 92 N.Y. at 451 (“[A] remainder shall be limited on more than two successive
estates for life[;] all the life estates subsequent to those of the two persons first entitled thereto shall be void . . . .” (quoting 1 R. S. 723, § 17) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
29
See, e.g., Buffalo Seminary v. McCarthy, 451 N.Y.S.2d 457, 463 (App. Div. 1982),
aff’d, Buffalo Seminary v. McCarthy, 447 N.E.2d 76 (N.Y. 1983); Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at
382 (noting that RAP would not apply to the provision at issue before 1965, regardless of
whether that provision was an option or a preemptive right); Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945
N.E.2d at 281 (Read, J., concurring).
30
See In re Wilcox, 87 N.Y. at 500 (questioning the reasoning of various sections in the
statute, claiming “they added nothing” to the aforementioned sections, and jesting that perhaps “the revisers were under delusion as to their necessity”); Purdy, 92 N.Y. at 451 (stating
that the statute has “no necessary connection with the law of perpetuities”).
31
Buffalo Seminary, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 461 (stating that options to purchase were not covered under the 1830 statute); Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at 382 (reasoning that options to purchase
and preemptive rights were both valid under the 1830 statute).
32
Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 803.
33
Id.; Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at 382. There are some modifications. For example, a presumption that only men over fourteen and women between the ages of twelve and fifty-five
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No estate in property shall be valid unless it must vest,
if at all, not later than twenty-one years after one or
more lives in being at the creation of the estate and
any period of gestation involved. In no case shall lives
measuring the permissible period of vesting be so designated or so numerous as to make proof of their end
unreasonably difficult.34
The statutory change in revoking the requirements of two lives in being and the period of minority shows that the legislature specifically
intended to incorporate the American common law rules governing
perpetuities into the New York statute.35 New York‟s purpose in codifying the common law rule was the same as that in The Duke of
Norfolk’s Case nearly 300 years prior: to promote land development
and provide greater alienation of property.36 Since its inception, the
statutory rule has been continually proclaimed “inflexible, measured
solely by the passage of time.”37 No longer is the rule a balancing
test as originally conceptualized at English common law.38 In accordance with this rigidity, RAP cannot be waived by agreement of the
parties, and if a violation occurs, a court will invalidate the entire
provision.39
If an interest extends beyond the perpetuities period it is not
necessarily void under New York‟s RAP law. New York‟s Estate
Powers & Trusts Law (EPTL) § 9-1.3, commonly referred to as “the
„saving statute,‟ ”40 presumes that “the creator intended the estate to
be valid.”41 The statute further provides that if the vesting of an incan produce children. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(e)(1) (McKinney 2012).
34
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.1(b) (McKinney 2012).
35
Buffalo Seminary, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 462 (reviewing the legislative history).
36
Kaiser-Haidri v. Battery Place Green, LLC, 925 N.Y.S.2d 557, 560 (App. Div. 2011)
(quoting Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 475).
37
Inwood Park Apartments, Inc. v. Coinmach Indus. Co., 783 N.Y.S.2d 453, 457 (Sup.
Ct. 2004); see also Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 803 (claiming New York‟s statutory
RAP law is “a rigid formula” unlike the common law rule which “evaluate[d] the reasonableness of the restraint based on its duration [and] purpose”).
38
See Wildenstein & Co., 595 N.E.2d at 649 (stating that RAP originated as an ad hoc
balancing principle which over time “acquired rigid encrustations” as a reaction to modern
transactions).
39
Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at 381.
40
See, e.g., Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 806; TDNI Props., LLC v. Saratoga
Glen Builders, LLC, 914 N.Y.S.2d 746, 748 (App. Div. 2011).
41
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(b) (McKinney 2012).
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terest is dependent upon “any specified contingency, it shall be presumed that the creator of [the interest] intended such contingency to
occur, if at all, within twenty-one years from the effective date of the
instrument creating such estate.”42 The policy of such a rule is to
protect interests that violate RAP on their face, but that typically take
a short time to vest.43 However, the saving statute does not allow for
an “extensive rewriting of [an] option agreement . . . to make it conform to the permissible period”;44 nor can it be used to insert a time
limitation when no time restrictions appear.45
III.

PAST RAP EXEMPTIONS BY THE NEW YORK COURT OF
APPEALS

Following the enactment of the current statute, the New York
courts have been called upon, on numerous occasions, to interpret its
meaning.46 In particular, the reasoning behind two previous Court of
Appeals cases, Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Bruken
Realty Corp.47 and Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola Props., Inc.,48
help illuminate its determination in Bleecker Street.
A.

Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Bruken
Realty Corp.

In 1986, the Court of Appeals sought to determine RAP‟s applicability to preemptive rights (also referred to as rights of first re42

N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(c) (McKinney 2012).
Rozina v. Casa 74th Dev. LLC, 907 N.Y.S.2d 603, 607 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (finding that an
option to purchase a condominium unit was valid because it was to take place on a to-bedetermined closing date and closings are “expected to occur within a relatively short period
of time after the date of execution of the Option Agreement”). But see Symphony Space,
Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 807-08 (holding that the parties‟ expectation that the purchase option
would be exercised within the statutory period does not validate an option that expressly allows the holder to exercise the option three years beyond the perpetuities period).
44
Symphony Space, Inc, 669 N.E.2d at 807; TDNI Props., 914 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
45
TDNI Props., 914 N.Y.S.2d at 748-49 (reasoning that the lack of any time limitation,
paired with the express terms letting the option pass to the holders‟ heirs and assignees,
shows an intent to allow the option to last in perpetuity).
46
See, e.g., Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d 484; Symphony Space, 669 N.E.2d
799; Wildenstein & Co., 595 N.E.2d 828; Bruken, 492 N.E.2d 379. A simple Westlaw
search yields approximately 150 New York cases discussing RAP since the enactment of
the1965 amended statute.
47
492 N.E.2d 379 (N.Y. 1986).
48
669 N.E.2d 799 (N.Y. 1996).
43
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fusal).49 In this case, the MTA and Bruken‟s predecessor entered into
an “option agreement”50 giving the predecessor a ninety-nine year
right to purchase property, at market value, if and when the MTA decided it was unnecessary for its operations.51 After Bruken was assigned the right, the MTA concluded it no longer required the property and Bruken sought to exercise its right. 52 The MTA brought a
declaratory judgment action to determine if the right was void under
RAP.53
The court held that preemptive rights within government and
commercial transactions should be exempt from the statutory RAP
law for public policy concerns.54 In its ruling, the court first noted
the policy reasons under common law RAP were to “ensure the productive use and development of property by its current beneficial
owners by simplifying ownership, facilitating exchange and freeing
property from unknown or embarrassing impediments to alienability.”55 The court thereafter noted that EPTL § 9-1.1 was an “inflexible” rule, “measured solely by the passage of time.”56 Yet while
commenting on this inflexibility, the court found that the utility of the
rule was offset by “modern legal transactions,” which allow for an
exemption of preemptive rights from the rule.57 The court reasoned
that enforcement of the right actually promoted the underlying policy
reasons for RAP by encouraging the holder of the right to develop the
property and ensure his ability to recoup his investment.58 The court
found this to be particularly true in government and business transactions, reasoning that neither “lives in being” nor “twenty one years”

49

Bruken, 492 N.E.2d 379.
Though the parties called their agreement an “option agreement,” the court determined
that what Bruken‟s predecessor purchased, and what Bruken was assigned, was in fact a
preemptive right. Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at 382. The difference between an option and a
preemptive right is that an option holder can force the property owner into honoring his option right, whereas a preemptive right only requires the owner to give the holder a right of
first refusal when a predetermined condition is satisfied. See, e.g., id. (distinguishing between options and preemptive rights).
51
Id. at 380.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 381.
54
Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at 385.
55
Id. at 381 (citing De Peyster v. Michael, 6 N.Y. 467, 494 (1852)).
56
Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at 381.
57
Id. at 383.
58
Id. at 383-84.
50
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are relevant in such transactions.59 Subsequently, the court extended
the scope of this ruling by exempting preemptive rights regarding
personal property in commercial transactions from RAP.60
B.

Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola Properties, Inc.

Ten years later, the court was confronted with whether New
York‟s statutory RAP law should apply to commercial options to
purchase.61 In this case, the parties devised a complex arrangement
to provide mutually beneficial tax exemptions in which Symphony
Space purchased property and leased it back to the original owner,
Broadwest Realty Corp.62 As part of this transaction, the original
owner was granted an option to repurchase the property up to twentyfour years after the sale.63 Furthermore, the option to purchase was
written as a separate agreement and stated that the right to exercise
the option was unconditional and not dependent on any other obligations between the parties other than rent past-due at the time of closing.64 The original owner transferred its right to purchase to Pergola
Properties, Inc. (“Pergola”).65 When Pergola attempted to exercise its
option, Symphony Space brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment
that the option violated RAP and was therefore void.66
The Court of Appeals quoted Bruken on the importance of
RAP and the policy reasons for its enforcement.67 The court reasoned that because an option to purchase can allow the holder to purchase the property at any time, and even perhaps at a preset price
59

Id. at 384. The court did not discuss RAP as it applies to options.
Wildenstein & Co., 595 N.E.2d at 833-34 (holding that an agreement regarding artwork
between an art dealer and art collector constituted a “significant commercial interest” which
did not hinder the public policy rights of RAP because it “facilitate[ed] broader marketing of
world-renowned art treasures while posing . . . only a minimal limitation on the alienability
of the works”). In Morrison v. Piper, the court declined to extend the exemption to preemptive rights in residential transactions. 556 N.E.2d 643, 646 (N.Y. 1990).
61
Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 800.
62
Id. at 800-01. This sale and lease-back transaction would allow Symphony Space to
receive a sizable tax exemption allowing it to use the property at minimal cost; meanwhile,
Broadwest would see a reduction in real estate taxes while retaining a substantial rental income. Id.
63
Id. at 801.
64
Id. at 801-02.
65
Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 802.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 803 (stating RAP seeks freedom of alienability and simplification of ownership).
60
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lower than market value, it “creates a disincentive for the landowner
to develop the property and hinders its alienability.”68 Such an effect
defeats the common law policy of RAP, which EPTL § 9-1.1 is intended to replicate.69 The court further made a distinction between its
ruling in Bruken, exempting preemptive rights in commercial and
government contracts from RAP, and its current holding that options
to purchase are not exempt.70 However, the court failed to articulate
precisely whether its holding was to apply to all options generally or
only to options to purchase.71
The court articulated the possibility that an option to purchase
may be valid even though its interest may vest beyond the statutory
RAP period.72 The court stated that if an option originated in the
lease, cannot be exercised after the lease expires, and cannot be separated from the lease, it will be exempt from RAP as an “appendant”
or “appurtenant” option (appurtenant option).73 The common law
public policy reasons for RAP, again, were the motives for exemption
of particular interests from New York‟s statutory RAP law.74 The
court found that appurtenant options encourage the holder to “invest
in maintaining and developing the property by guaranteeing the option holder the ultimate benefit of any such investment,” much like
the reasoning for exempting preemptive options in Bruken.75
Lastly, the court discussed whether the option could be saved
under the saving statute by shortening the exercise period.76 Howev68
Id. at 804, 805. But see Robert E. Parella, Real Property, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 681,
701-02 (1997) (claiming that a court should balance the disincentives purchase options
create in improving the property for landlords and the incentives for improvement they provide the option holder as an alternative to the appurtenant exemption test).
69
Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 804-05.
70
Id. at 805 (“[U]nlike options, preemptive rights . . . in the context of the governmental
and commercial transaction[s] . . . actually encourage[] the use and development of the land,
outweighing any minor impediment to alienability.”).
71
Id. at 804 (stating that “[u]nder the common law, options to purchase land are subject to
the rule” and further that “[i]t is now settled in New York that, generally, EPTL 9-1.1[] applies to options.”) (emphasis added).
72
Id. at 806.
73
Id.; Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at 383.
74
Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 806.
75
Id. (stating that the option was not appurtenant because it was separate from the lease
agreement, the right to exercise was exempt from any other lease obligation, and the option
could be exercised beyond the lease term). But see Parella, supra, note 68, at 702 (claiming
the appurtenant exemption requirements are “highly formalistic” burdens).
76
Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 806-07.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss1/14

10

Vecchi: Repulsed by RAP?

2012]

REPULSED BY RAP?

215

er, use of the saving statute requires that a “contrary intention” does
not appear in the agreement.77 The court held that an option that explicitly provides for a definite exercise period over twenty-one years
cannot be revised under the savings statute.78
IV.

OPTIONS TO RENEW RULINGS LEADING UP TO BLEECKER
STREET

Clearly, options to purchase were found to be subject to RAP
under the Symphony Space ruling.79 However, the court was ambiguous as to whether its reasoning applied to options to renew.80
Therefore, after Symphony Space, many New York courts took different approaches to whether an option to renew is subject to and/or
valid under RAP.81
Many lower courts determined that options to renew should
be accorded the same legal analysis as options to purchase; therefore,
RAP and the appurtenant exception applied to options to renew.82
For example, in Deer Cross Shopping LLC v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co.,83 the parties entered into a twenty-five year lease agree-

77

N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(a) (McKinney 2012).
Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 807 (holding that the unambiguous exercise period of twenty-four years cannot be “saved” under the saving statute).
79
See, e.g., Harrington v. Gage, 843 N.Y.S.2d 745, 746 (App. Div. 2007) (holding option
to purchase property in a lease to harvest hay was void under RAP and was not saved by the
appurtenant exception because the option was separable from the lease) (citing Symphony
Space, 669 N.E.2d at 806).
80
Inwood Park Apartments, Inc., 783 N.Y.S.2d at 458 (“[T]he Court has held that all options in real estate are subject to the rule against perpetuities.”) (quoting Symphony Space,
Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 477-78) (emphasis added); see Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 804
(“Under the common law, options to purchase land are subject to [RAP] . . . .”); contra Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 804 (“It is now settled in New York that, generally [RAP]
applies to options.”).
81
See, e.g., Soldiers‟, Sailors‟, Marines‟, & Airmen‟s Club, Inc. v. Carlton Regency
Corp., 911 N.Y.S.2d 774, 778-79, 781 (Sup. Ct. 2010), aff’d, Soldiers‟, Sailors‟, Marines‟ &
Airmen‟s Club, Inc. v. Carlton Regency Corp., 945 N.Y.S.2d 40 (App. Div. 2012) (looking
at the Restatement (First) of Property in holding a renewal option valid); Deer Cross Shopping LLC v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 773 N.Y.S.2d 211, 213 (Sup. Ct. 2003) (renewal
options are subject to RAP, but can be saved by the appurtenant exemption).
82
See, e.g., Double C Realty Corp. v. Craps, LLC, 870 N.Y.S.2d 333, 334 (Sup. Ct. 2009)
(option to renew lease met the requirements for the appurtenant exception and was thus not
void under RAP); Soldiers’, Sailors’, 911 N.Y.S.2d at 780 (citing cases where the appurtenant exception was applied).
83
773 N.Y.S.2d 211 (Sup. Ct. 2003).
78
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ment with three ten-year options to renew.84 The lease provided that
the tenant give notice of its intent to use its renewal option at least
eleven months before it would take effect.85 Failure to confer such
notice required the landlord to furnish the tenant notice of the tenant‟s option and allowed a sixty-day extension for the tenant to renew.86 If the landlord failed to notify within sixty days, the lease
term was extended to sixty days after tenant received the reminder
notice of its renewal options.87
In determining whether the options to renew were void under
RAP, the court took note of the appurtenant exemption as articulated
in Symphony Space, stating that, “options that originate in one of the
lease provisions, are not exercisable after the lease expires and are incapable of separation from the lease, are valid even though the option
holder‟s interest might vest beyond the perpetuities period.”88 Judge
Cahn held that the renewal option at issue was appurtenant to the
lease under this definition because he interpreted the sixty-day extension to exercise the renewal option as also extending the original
lease term; therefore, the option was not “exercisable after the lease
expire[d].”89
Other courts have devised more individualistic ways of determining the RAP analysis for options to renew. In 224 Seventh
Street Associates, LLC v. AMP Management, Inc.,90 the renewal option was for “an additional period of five (5) years from expiration of
the lease term . . . .”91 The landlord argued that the option was void
under RAP because the holder could renew at any time, even after the
expiration of the lease term.92 Judge Fairgrieve held the option valid
by choosing an interpretation of the agreement that would render
RAP inapplicable and by looking at what the landlord and tenant in-

84

Id. at 212.
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. The opinion provides a discrepancy regarding the notice requirements in the lease;
however, the terms described are the most logical and the ones most often used by the court
in its description of the terms.
88
Deer Cross Shopping LLC, 773 N.Y.S.2d at 213 (citing Symphony Space, Inc., 669
N.E.2d at 806).
89
Deer Cross Shopping LLC, 773 N.Y.S.2d at 213-14.
90
No. SP006535/09, 2010 WL 1463036 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 13, 2010).
91
Id.
92
Id.
85
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tended under the agreement.93 The judge stated that, “[i]t is implied
that the renewal must take effect before [the lease expires].”94 Furthermore, the judge held that the tenant may exercise his right to renew simply by maintaining possession after the lease expires.95
In Soldiers’, Sailors’, Marines’, & Airmen’s Club, Inc. v.
Carlton Regency Corp.,96 Judge Ramos relied on the Restatement
(First) of Property97 in determining whether two, twenty-five year options to renew were valid.98 The judge held that even though the option seemed to be a perpetuity at first glance, under the Restatement,
the landlord‟s argument that the options must be exercised immediately upon the expiration of the initial lease period “renders [RAP]
inapplicable.”99 Furthermore, the judge acknowledged an interesting
argument by the tenant, who suggested that the provision should violate RAP because it placed an “unreasonable restraint on alienation”
by requiring the tenant to perform repairs during the lease term.100
The tenant claimed that creating such conditions prevents free alienation of the property.101 This policy argument is commendable considering the public policy reasoning made by the Court of Appeals
when exempting certain preemptive rights in Bruken and creating the
appurtenant exemption for options. However, the court ultimately rejected this argument stating that New York statutory RAP is measured “exclusively by the passage of time,” thereby making public

93

Id. The judge did not provide this analysis under the saving statute; nor was there any
mention of Symphony Space, Inc.
94
Id. (claiming that the parties could not have agreed to exercise the option after the lease
expired).
95
224 Seventh St. Assocs. LLC, 2010 WL 1463036 (quoting Brooks v. Elabed, 801
N.Y.S.2d 230 (App. Term 2005)).
96
911 N.Y.S.2d 774 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
97
Id. at 778-79. Restatement (First) of Property § 395 states in pertinent part:
When a lease limits in favor of the lessee an option exercisable at a time
not more remote than the end of the lessee‟s term . . . to obtain . . . an extension of his former lease, then such option is effective, in accordance
with the terms of the limitation, even when it may continue for longer
than the maximum period.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP: OPTION LIMITED IN FAVOR OF A LESSEE § 395
(2012)).
98
Soldiers’, Sailors’, 911 N.Y.S.2d at 778-79.
99
Id. at 779, 781.
100
Id. at 781.
101
Id.
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policy arguments irrelevant.102
V.

BLEECKER STREET TENANTS CORP. V. BLEEKER JONES LLC
A.

The Lease, Background of the Case, and the
Parties’ Arguments

On September 1, 1983, the parties entered into a commercial
lease in which Bleecker Street Tenants Corp. (“Landlord”) was the
landlord and Bleeker Jones LLC (“Tenant”) was the tenant.103 The
lease provided for a fourteen-year initial term with nine consecutive
renewal options.104 Under the lease, an option to renew would be executed when Tenant gave at least six months notice to Landlord of its
intent to renew before the previous term expired.105 Additionally, the
options clause provided a “savings provision,” which was at the heart
of the case.106 The provision states in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event [Tenant]
has not heretofore timely exercised any renewal option . . . each such renewal option shall continue to
remain in effect and [Tenant] may exercise such renewal option within sixty (60) days after [Landlord]
notified [Tenant] in writing of its right to exercise
each such option, notwithstanding the fact that the
term of said lease may have expired. If the term shall
have expired, [Tenant] shall remain in possession as a
month-to-month tenant until [Landlord] shill [sic]
have complied with the foregoing.107
102
Id. The court however does state that the argument would have held weight under
common law RAP because “the common-law rule evaluate[d] the reasonableness of the
[condition].” Soldiers’, Sailors’, 911 N.Y.S.2d at 781 (quoting Symphony Space, Inc., 669
N.E.2d at 476).
103
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 484.
104
Id. at 484-85; Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent at *8 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp. v.
Bleeker Jones LLC, 945 N.E.2d 484 (N.Y. 2011) (No. 2011-0012).
105
Brief for Defendants-Appellants at *6, Bleecker St. Tenants Corp. v. Bleeker Jones
LLC, 945 N.E.2d 484 (N.Y. 2011) (No. 2011-0012).
106
Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent, supra note 104, at *8.
107
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp. v. Bleecker Jones LLC, No. 600053-2008, 2008 WL
4411822 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 4, 2008), rev’d, Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., v. Bleeker Jones
LLC, 882 N.Y.S.2d 42 (App. Div. 2009), rev’d, 945 N.E.2d 484 (N.Y. 2011). The Supreme
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Simply put, if Tenant failed to provide its sixty-day notice, Tenant
was entitled to remain in possession as a month-to-month tenant
without the expiration of any renewal option.108 Landlord then had
the right to provide sixty days notice of Tenant‟s ability to renew,
within which time Tenant must renew or the option expired.109
The original lease term expired on August 31, 1997, without
Tenant‟s exercising its right to renew; thus, Tenant remained as a
month-to-month tenant after that date.110 Ten years later, Landlord
brought the action under discussion, claiming the renewal options
under the lease violated RAP and were thus void.111 Landlord
claimed that Symphony Space held that RAP applied to all options.112
Landlord also argued that the renewal options are not appurtenant to
the lease, claiming that the month-to-month tenancy, which took effect when tenant failed to exercise its renewal, was a “holdover provision” and not an extension of the lease.113 Therefore, Landlord
claimed that the options to renew could be exercised after the lease
expired and they could not be saved under the appurtenant exemption; nor could the option be saved under EPTL § 9.1-3 because the
options contained no durational limitations, showing the parties‟ intent that the options last indefinitely, and EPTL § 9.1-3 cannot alter
an unequivocal interpretation of the lease.114
Tenant argued that renewal options should be exempt from
RAP because such options promote the public policy behind the
rule.115 Tenant contended that both Landlord and Tenant benefit
from the renewal options, to which Tenant provided assurances that it
Court refers to the defendant as “Bleecker Jones LLC,” whereas the Appellate Division and
the Court of Appeals spell the defendant‟s name as Bleeker Jones LLC. In its briefs, the defendant spells its name in accordance with the latter. Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra
note 105, at *1.
108
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 485.
109
Id.
110
Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent, supra note 104, at *9.
111
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 2008 WL 4411822; Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 105, at *8 (suggesting the Landlord brought this action due to a change in the tax
law, which allowed Landlord to generate a higher rental income without subjecting itself to
an increased tax rate).
112
Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent, supra note 104, at *16.
113
Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent, supra note 104, at *29-30. A holdover tenancy results
at the expiration of a lease by operation of law and each month is considered a separate contract for a new lease term. Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 882 N.Y.S.2d at 46.
114
Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent, supra note 104, at *36.
115
Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 105, at *15.
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could recoup its investment in property and therefore encourage its
development of the premises.116 Meanwhile, Landlord‟s property became more attractive to potential buyers, as the property came with a
long-term tenant, making the land more alienable.117 Tenant alternatively argued, if renewal options are subject to the rule, the options in
the current lease are appurtenant, and therefore exempt from RAP.118
Lastly, Tenant argued that any ambiguity in the language of the lease
must be determined in favor of the option‟s validity, as EPTL § 9-1.3
requires a presumption that the creator of the lease intended it to be
valid.119
B.

New York Supreme Court Decision

After both parties sought summary judgment, the Supreme
Court held that the options to renew in the lease were not barred by
RAP.120 Although the court noted that Symphony Space involved an
option to purchase, it also recognized that Deer Cross held a renewal
option was subject to the appurtenant exemption.121 The Supreme
Court held that the renewal option at issue did not violate RAP because it qualified as appurtenant to the lease as the option originated
in the lease, could only be exercised while the lease was in effect, and
could not be separated from the lease.122 In so holding, the court rejected Landlord‟s claim that the lease expired when Tenant failed to
give notice of its renewal, but rather held that the month-to-month
occupancy was a continuation of the lease.123 By holding the renewal
options valid under the appurtenant exemption, the Supreme Court
adopted the majority view regarding the applicability of New York‟s
RAP law on such options: that the exemption was meant to include
renewal options.124
116

Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 105, at *15.
Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 105, at *15, 19 (arguing that renewal options are less restrictive than preemptive rights).
118
Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 105, at *20, 28 (arguing that the monthto-month tenancy was not a holdover because Tenant was still subject to the lease terms
throughout that time period).
119
Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 105, at *28.
120
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 2008 WL 4411822.
121
Id.
122
Id. (considering the option to be analogous to the option in Deer Cross Shopping LLC).
123
Id.
124
Id. The court failed to address the possibility of exempting renewal options from RAP
117
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Appellate Court Determination

The Appellate Division also pondered the appurtenant exemption in determining the validity of the renewal options under RAP.125
The court focused on the phrase “[i]f the term shall have expired”
Tenant will become a month-to-month tenant until Landlord provides
sixty days notice of the renewal.126 The court considered this phrase
to be the unequivocal intention by the parties to allow Tenant to utilize its options after the expiration of the lease.127 The court reasoned
that the month-to-month tenancy stipulated in the lease was a reiteration of New York‟s default rule upon the expiration of a lease and
was not an extension of the lease itself.128 As a result of this reasoning, the Appellate Division found that the renewal options were not
appurtenant to the lease because they could be exercised after the
lease expired.129
Furthermore, the court held the saving statute could not save
the options because the only interpretation to be made is one that violates RAP, and the court cannot rewrite the provision to allow it to
properly vest.130 Lastly, the court stated that the renewal options in
the case “call[] to mind the very object of [RAP], „to defeat an intent
of a . . . grantor to create unreasonably long restrictions upon the use
or marketability of . . . property.‟ ”131 Therefore, the Appellate Division reversed the decision of the Supreme Court.132

for public policy purposes, but did discuss how strict the rule was on contingent interests.
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 2008 WL 4411822.
125
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp. v. Bleeker Jones LLC, 882 N.Y.S.2d 42, 43 (App. Div.
2009), rev’d, Bleecker St. Tenants Corp. v. Bleeker Jones LLC, 945 N.E.2d 484 (N.Y. 2011).
126
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 882 N.Y.S.2d at 45-46 (internal quotation marks omitted).
127
Id. at 46 (“This explicit recognition that the lease term expires if not renewed establishes that the renewal option clause was intended to give the tenant an ability to renew [after
expiration].”).
128
Id. (determining that the alternative view is that the lease could last in perpetuity under
the month-to-month tenancy providing the Landlord never gave notice to Tenant of the renewal option).
129
Id. at 47.
130
Id. at 46-47.
131
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 882 N.Y.S.2d at 47 (quoting In re Kellogg, 316 N.Y.S.2d
293, 296 (App. Div. 1970)).
132
Id.
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New York Court of Appeals Decision

The Court of Appeals was heavily divided in its reasoning.
Even so, the majority opinion, written by Judge Jones, was succinct.133 Unlike the lower courts, the Court of Appeals did not focus
on the appurtenant exception test, but rather on the treatment of the
common law on renewal options. The court noted that under the
common law, perpetual renewal options were not void under RAP.134
The court reasoned that since the New York statute is a codification
of the common law rule, it follows that renewal options should be exempt from New York RAP.135
Furthermore, the court explored the principles underlying a
rule against perpetuities.136 The court reiterated that the prime objective of RAP was always “to protect the alienability of property.”137
The court then explained that renewal options naturally render the
lease and the property more alienable by making the property more
attractive to a potential buyer, should the owner wish to sell.138 The
court expanded on this reasoning by distinguishing renewal options
from options to purchase, because renewals do not enable the option
holder to divest title from the owner139 and are “inherently appurtenant to the lease.”140 Lastly, the court noted that the renewal option
at bar “encourage[s] the efficient use of the property” as it allows a
tenant to maintain possession without interruption.141
Judge Read‟s concurring opinion found a number of faults
with the majority opinion and suggested a different theory as to why
the renewal option should be valid.142 Judge Read took particular

133
Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Smith, and Pigott concurred in the majority
opinion.
134
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 486 (citing Hoff v. Royal Metal Furniture
Co., 103 N.Y.S. 371 (1907)); see also Edwin H. Abbot, Leases and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 27 YALE L. J. 878, 883 (1918) (suggesting that perpetual renewal options were an
exception to common law RAP).
135
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 487.
136
Id. at 485.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 487 (noting that renewal options are regularly used in commercial transactions to
attract potential tenants).
139
Id. at 486.
140
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 487.
141
Id. (stating that the option is consistent with the public policy purposes of RAP).
142
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 487-88 (Read, J., concurring).
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note that common law RAP was not applied to perpetual renewal options.143 She reasoned that perpetual options are different from options with a definite end date because, in essence, they give the tenant
a fee simple in the property.144 Therefore, considering that the purpose of RAP has been to invalidate restraints on alienability, perpetual renewal options were rightfully exempted under the common law
rule.145
Second, Judge Read noted that the authorities cited by the majority, showing that non-perpetual renewal options were exempt under common law RAP, were actually cases (and articles about cases)
that were decided under New York‟s narrow statutory rule, which
notably excluded options.146 Judge Read concluded that the majority‟s reasoning for exempting all renewal options “is simply not supported by the authorities cited.”147
Judge Read then stated that the Symphony Space ruling was
intended to encompass all real estate options and thus the appurtenant
exemption should be applied to lease renewals.148 In determining
whether the option could be exercised after the lease terminates,
Judge Read, like the Appellate Division, sought to define the scope of
the term in the lease.149 The judge found that the lease did not expire
when the month-to-month tenancy was triggered because the lease
provided for continuing “rights and responsibilities” during that period, which would not have been the case if the month-to-month tenancy was a reiteration of the statutory default rule.150 Therefore,
Judge Read concluded that the option could not be exercised after the
143

Id. at 488.
Id. (quoting William Berg, Long-Term Options and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 37
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 22 (1949)).
145
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 488 (Read, J., concurring). To solidify this
point, Judge Read discusses Bridges v. Hitchcock, (1715) 2 Eng. Rep. 498 (H.L.) (discussing
how a perpetual renewal option makes a tenant inclined to improve the property). Id. at 48889.
146
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 489-490 (Read, J., concurring). Judge Read
then notes that the cases cited by the majority would have been saved under the appurtenant
exemption, had it been available to those renewal options at the time. Id. at 490.
147
Id.
148
Id. Judge Read notes that the parties only dispute was whether the option could be exercised after the lease expires; therefore, she restricts her analysis to that part of the appurtenant exemption test. Id. at 491.
149
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 491 (Read, J., concurring).
150
Id. Judge Read provides the example that the tenant must maintain property damage
insurance of at least $500,000 during the month-to-month tenancy. Id.
144
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lease expired and the court should have determined that the renewal
option was appurtenant to the lease.151
In Judge Graffeo‟s dissent, she argued that exempting all renewal options is inconsistent with the plain meaning of EPTL § 91.1(b) and the holding in Symphony Space.152 Judge Graffeo made
note of many inconsistencies and poor conclusions in the majority
opinion.153 She stated that while the majority was correct in noting
perpetual options to renew were exempt from RAP at the turn of the
twentieth century, New York was not following the common law rule
at that time, as the majority assumed.154 Judge Graffeo stated that
New York had a statutory rule since 1830, which “was drafted so narrowly that it [excluded options].”155 Therefore, the authorities cited
by the majority as common law decisions were in fact decided under
the old statute and its reasoning was therefore faulty.156 Furthermore,
those cases were superseded in 1965, when New York adopted the
common law rule, which covered options.157
The dissent further referred to the previous Court of Appeals
cases that held options were under RAP‟s grasp.158 Judge Graffeo
stated that these previous rulings alone should prevent the court from
exempting renewal options as a class.159 The dissent then stated that
the majority should have applied the appurtenant exception to the renewal option and praised the lower courts for taking such a view.160
The dissent noted two important reasons why the court should have
adhered to the appurtenant exemption as opposed to the general
waiver.161 First, Judge Graffeo opposed the majority‟s statement that
151

Id. (agreeing with the Supreme Court‟s decision).
Bleecker Street Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 491 (Graffeo, J., dissenting).
153
Id. at 491-92, 493.
154
Id. at 492.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 492, 493 (“[T]he early twentieth century decisions that the majority relie[d] on
were grounded on the absence of a statutory prohibition that applied to perpetual leases.”).
157
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 493 (Graffeo, J., dissenting). Judge Graffeo
also states that the cases cited by the majority were perpetual lease renewals, “which are not
at issue in this case.” Id.
158
Id. at 492-93 (citing Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 804; Wildenstein & Co., 595
N.E.2d at 832; Buffalo Seminary, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 462).
159
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 493 (Graffeo, J., dissenting).
160
Id. The dissent also recognizes other lower court decisions over the past fifteen years
which applied the appurtenant test in similar circumstances. Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945
N.E.2d at 493 (Graffeo, J., dissenting).
161
Id. at 493-94.
152
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an option to renew inherently originates in the lease and therefore is
always appurtenant.162 She stated that there is no bar against parties
to a lease that would prevent them from creating an option renewal
contract after entering into a lease agreement–and in such instances
the option would fail the appurtenant test and be void under RAP according to Symphony Space.163 Additionally, the dissent noted that a
renewal option could be worded to allow the exercise of the option
after the original lease expired.164 Judge Graffeo stated that such an
option would discourage a landlord from improving the property and
hinder transferability because the option holder possesses his right to
renew at the old price, after expiration of the original term.165 The
dissent stated, “[RAP] was designed to deter such barriers to transferability.”166 Judge Graffeo then reasoned that under the appurtenant
test, the option at bar would fail and be void under RAP because the
lease expressly expired when the month-to-month tenancy was triggered and the lease wrongfully allowed the tenant to exercise its option after the expiration of the lease.167
VI.

THE REALITIES OF THE BLEECKER STREET DECISION

Considering the New York Court of Appeals‟ line of cases
over the last twenty-five years, it is not surprising that the court has
continued to narrow the scope of RAP in Bleecker Street.168 In Folio
House Inc. v. Barrister Realty Partners,169 the single New York case
deciding RAP‟s applicability to renewal options since Bleecker
Street, the court‟s opinion was short, comprised of only a few sentences. In Folio, the court, in considering whether a renewal option
could vest after the tenant left possession, simply noted that it “need
not resolve the parties‟ disagreement on the interpretation of the lease
162

Id.
Id.
164
Id. at 494.
165
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 494 (Graffeo, J., dissenting).
166
Id.
167
Id. (following the same reasoning as the Appellate Division). Thus, the difference between the concurring and dissenting opinions is whether the lease expired when the monthto-month tenancy was triggered, which has a dispositive outcome on whether the option
could be exercised after the lease expires.
168
See, e.g., Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d 799; Wildenstein & Co., 595 N.E.2d 828;
Bruken, 492 N.E.2d 379.
169
No. 118068/2009, 2011 WL 1467646 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 21, 2011).
163
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language.”170 The court stated that Bleecker Street expressly held
that RAP does not apply to renewal options and therefore the option
in the case at bar is not void under RAP.171
It is very rare in the area of property law, and particularly regarding RAP, for there to be a black letter rule because of the strong
influence of public policy in its application.172 However, in Bleecker
Street, the Court of Appeals made it very clear that RAP does not apply to any renewal options in New York State.173 In regard to these
options, the courts no longer have to determine whether the appurtenant exemption applies to analyze the particular option under the
rule. Furthermore, the courts do not need to determine whether a renewal option that fails RAP on its face may be allowed under the saving statute. Such a clear ruling will deter most parties with similar
disputes from litigating. The cases that do make it to the courts‟
docket can be swiftly resolved.174 In a case on appeal after Bleecker
Street, the landlord ceded its argument that the renewal option violated RAP and instead pursued other avenues to void the lease renewals.175 Clearly, Bleecker Street allows courts to avoid the complexity of RAP, at least in the area of lease renewal options.
A.

Benefits of the Bleecker Street Decision

The court‟s decision in Bleecker Street is also consistent with
both Bruken and Symphony Space. The Bruken court found that
preemptive rights in government and commercial contracts should be
exempt from RAP because an exemption furthered the policies that
RAP was designed to advance.176 Similarly, the court in Bleecker
Street determined that exempting renewal options promoted the poli170
Id. at *2, *3. (“The Court of Appeals ruling [in Bleecker Street] applies to all options
to renew leases, and a fortiori, to the lease in this particular case.”).
171
Id. at *2.
172
See, e.g., Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 487 (stating the policy goals of
RAP were a large factor in exempting renewal options); Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at 383-84 (finding commercial and government preemptive rights were exempt from RAP because “enforcement did not violate the underlying purposes of the rule . . . .”).
173
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 484 (“We hold that [RAP] does not apply to
options to renew leases.”).
174
This was the situation in Folio House Inc., described above.
175
Soldiers‟, Sailors‟, Marines‟ & Airmen‟s Club, Inc. v. Carlton Regency Corp., 945
N.Y.S.2d 40 (App. Div. 2012).
176
Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at 384.
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cies of alienability, fostering productive use of property, and facilitating exchange.177 By allowing long-term renewal options (i.e., options
that would typically vest beyond the statutory perpetuities period), a
tenant may be more inclined to invest in the property to the same extent as an owner because of his reliance on the indestructibility of his
option, thereby maximizing productive use of the property. 178 The
landlord may also benefit from such options because of the possibility of acquiring a long-term tenant. This is true especially if the landlord wishes to put the property on the market because renewal options will make a property more attractive to other investors, thus
facilitating exchanges.179
More beneficial is the fact that long-term renewal options assist the surrounding community. When tenants are inclined to invest
in property, there is a greater opportunity for revitalization of the surrounding area.180 Not only will tenants be more interested in maintaining their establishment, but they also will be concerned about the
neighborhood, local political concerns, and community functions and
causes.181 Such initiatives become important to a long-term tenant,
because they affect their clientele, the value of their options and the
ability to quickly recoup their investment.182 Furthermore, such options do not hinder the commitment of the landlord, who continues to
own the land, in enhancing the value of the property and promoting
the prosperity of the surrounding community.183
177

Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 487.
Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 105, at *15.
179
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 487 (finding that renewal options “render[]
the lease more attractive and readily alienable than less so”); Brief for DefendantsAppellants, supra note 105, at *15 (stating that renewal options “make the property more
attractive to a buyer of the landlord‟s interest”).
180
See Lewis M. Simes, The Policy Against Perpetuities, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 707, 715
(1955) (stating that if a life tenant could invest in currently unproductive property, it could
become a profitable enterprise).
181
See Lee Anne Fennell & Julie A. Roin, Controlling Residential Stakes, 77 U. CHI. L.
REV. 143, 170 (2010) (suggesting that a new tenants lack of “social or economic networks,”
mixed with their uncertainty of future rent increases, negatively impacts their “incentives to
invest in the community”).
182
Being able to recoup investments in leased property was an important argument made
by Tenant. Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 105, at *15. Furthermore, the argument appears to have resonated with the court, though not explicitly mentioned in the opinion. Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 487. The court used the same argument in
Bruken in regard to preemptive rights. Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at 383-84.
183
Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 105, at *15 (“From the landlord‟s viewpoint, the restraint on alienability [if any] is minimal, because the property can still be trans178
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The Bleecker Street decision also alleviates the courts‟ dockets, allowing the judiciary to work more efficiently while providing a
means for spending less money. For many years, the court system
has noted the burden of high cases and low resources, and decisions
that reduce litigation help to mitigate these costs.184 Claims or defenses based on RAP in the lease renewal context can now be dismissed swiftly during pre-trial litigation and at the trial level.185 Furthermore, the economic impact of the ruling extends to landlords and
tenants.186 RAP‟s application to renewal options can no longer be a
point of contention, potentially leading to lengthy litigation in court
and animosity between two parties in a business relationship which
behooves them to remain amicable.
The holding of Bleecker Street also promotes the increasingly
popular conservative views of limited government and free market
policies.187 Exempting the entirety of renewal options from a strict
rule allows parties more freedom to contract.188 In agreeing to a renewal option, parties, especially tenants, will not have to worry about
the validity of the option.189 By removing RAP in this circumstance,

ferred subject to the lease.”).
184
See generally Vincent E. Doyle III, Court Funding: A Statewide Perspective, New
York State Bar Journal (Jan. 2012) (stating that decreases in court funding further burden
already overcrowded court systems and create negative effects on litigants and the public);
see also Richard S. Fries, Amendment to RPAPL Article 14 Allows Nonjudicial Foreclosure
of Commercial Mortgages, 70-Dec N.Y. St. B.J. 50, *50 (claiming New York‟s cumbersome
foreclosure process hinders an already overburdened court system).
185
See generally Folio House Inc., 927 N.Y.S.2d 816 (stating its ruling in a few short paragraphs).
186
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 487 (stating renewal options make leases
more attractive).
187
See, e.g., Michelle Malkin, GOP Looking for ‘Fresh Blood’, AMARILLO GLOBE-NEWS
(Feb. 17, 2012, 4:01PM), http://amarillo.com/opinion/opinion-columnist/weekly-opinioncolumnist/2012-02-17/gop-looking-fresh-blood (“[G]rassroots activists are coalescing
around a stellar slate of limited government candidates looking to reinforce and reenergize
the right in Washington.”).
188
See Joel C. Dobris, The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities, or the RAP Has No
Friends – An Essay, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601, 659 (2000):
We live in a world of default rules. Default rules are those that control in
absence of a contrary expression and can be easily set aside. It is beginning to seem as though almost every rule of law can be set aside. So
what is the big deal if we allow grantors to set aside the RAP?
Id.
189
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 484 (all renewal options are exempt from
RAP).
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courts will not interfere with the long-term goals of the tenant.190 The
tenant will then have the maximum possible chance to recoup any investment and improvement he made on the property based on the
availability of the option, without concern about the impact of RAP
on the option.191 In addition, both parties must assume more personal
responsibility to ensure that their deal will be profitable.192 Although
Bleecker Street furthers these conservative objectives, the Court of
Appeals‟ decision was not a political one. In fact, Judge Jones‟s majority opinion garnered support from judges appointed by both democratic and republican governors.193

B.

Contractual Changes and Landlord Repositioning

Removing RAP‟s statutory restraint on renewal options provides some protection to the tenant from the landlord.194 A landlord
is in a better position and more inclined to know about the intricacies
of a contract and the methods of invalidating provisions which are no
longer beneficial.195 This ruling prevents the courts from interfering
and allowing RAP to be one of the possible ways to remove a tenant
despite the provisions of a negotiated contract.196 Therefore, the ruling is more likely to promote property development through longterm tenants.197 Of course, it may also decrease the inclination of
landlords to agree to renewal options in their leases.198
190

See Simes, supra note 180, at 715 (incentivizing a tenant to make long-term improvements makes a more profitable investment).
191
See Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 484.
192
Soldiers’, Sailors’, 945 N.Y.S.2d 40 (“[T]hat is the deal that plaintiff struck.
Represented by competent counsel, it negotiated and executed the lease . . . and „the courts
will not interfere‟ with the economically harsh result.”).
193
Judges of the Court, COURT OF APPEALS: STATE OF NEW YORK,
http://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps (last visited Oct. 22, 2012) (see biography of each judge
under “Judges of the Court” tab).
194
See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat‟l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(“The inequality in bargaining power between landlord and tenant has been well documented.”).
195
Id.
196
See generally Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d 484.
197
Id. at 484 (allowing landlords and tenants to enter into perpetual renewal options without invalidation by RAP).
198
See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 111
(Nov. 1986) (stating that there is an inherent “tension between landlords and tenants over
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Another inevitable result of this decision is that landlords will
increase their reliance on providing conditions which accompany renewal options.199 Faced with the certainty of an option included as a
term in the lease, landlords are likely to find unique ways to ensure
that the renewal option remains favorable to their long-term goals.200
To protect their interests, the landlords will mainly rely on attaching
rental increases to any renewal options the tenant exercises.201 Without such a condition, and without the possibility of voiding the renewal options under RAP, the landlords‟ interests and profits under
the agreements could diminish quickly, especially in the face of multiple long-term renewals, perhaps in perpetuity. However, landlords
should be wary of not providing too many conditions or creating “to
be determined” rent amounts which may be void for vagueness as a
matter of contract law.202
The Bleecker Street decision does not leave landlords unprotected when creating their lease agreements, though it will hinder
those who utilize RAP as a means of escape when a lease turns
sour.203 As such, the landlords who continue to offer options to renew will likely come up with creative ways to back out of the option,
because they can no longer hide behind the intricacies of RAP. One
such possibility is including a provision in the lease that allows the
landlord to reject the tenant‟s exercise of an option for cause.204
Therefore, if the tenant is problematic (i.e. causing excessive damage
to the premises), and the landlord has the potential for a better busilease renewals”).
199
Hindquarter Corp. v. Prop. Dev. Corp., 631 P.2d 923, 926 (Wash. 1981) (“[P]rompt
payment of rent [was] a condition precedent to the renewal.”); 88 Am. Jur. Trials § 9 (2003)
(leases typically require compliance with all conditions of the lease as a condition precedent
of renewal).
200
See David E. Pierce, Evaluating the Jurisprudential Bases for Ascertaining or Defining
Coalbed Methane Ownership, 4 WYO. L. REV. 607, 612 (2004) (stating contracts should be
interpreted primarily based on the intent of the parties).
201
Even the Association of Legal Administrators (ALA) entered into leases which contained renewal options with attached 4% rent increases. A Message from the Executive Director, ALA News, July 1999, at 32.
202
Rhee v. Dohan, 457 N.Y.S.2d 684, 685 (App. Div. 1982) (finding tenant‟s letter was
unenforceable as creating a lease renewal agreement because it did not stipulate a rent
amount or provide a commencement date).
203
Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 105, at *8 (claiming landlord wanted to
terminate the lease because tax code changes made other opportunities more profitable).
204
See Williams v. Millward & Co., 412 N.W.2d 369, 369 (Minn. 1987) (noting that defendant‟s attempt to exercise his renewal option was rejected for cause).
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ness opportunity, he will not be forced to continue his relationship
with his current tenant.
Similarly, the landlord might provide terms in the lease for a
potential buy-back of the option.205 Like the denial for cause, this
will allow the landlord to pursue a better business venture by regaining the unexercised options upon payment of a premium to the current tenant.206 The availability of these types of conditions and others
means that landlords will have an incentive to include renewal options in their leases without the accompanying uncertainty about their
validity.207 However, increased reliance on these intricate conditions
also may lead to longer and more complex leases and, consequently,
more litigation as the parties quarrel over the provisions‟ meaning
and intention.
C.

The Concurring and Dissenting Opinions

The concurrence and dissent point out a number of faulty rationales in the majority opinion.208 Both Judges Read, in her concurring opinion, and Graffeo, in her dissenting opinion, discuss that the
majority bases its ruling, in part, on identifying the early 1900s as a
time New York used the common law rule, when in fact the State was
using the narrow 1830 statutory rule.209 Due to this error, Judge
Graffeo even argues that the majority fails to provide any authority
205

See Evaluating the Jurisprudential Bases for Ascertaining or Defining Coalbed Methane Ownership, supra note 200, at 612 (“Under the American freedom of contract model,
absent some flaw in the bargaining process . . . the public interest lies in giving effect to the
agreement freely made by the parties”); Aaron Bassan, Mortgages to Secure Other Indebtedness: A Statutory Proposal, 4 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 259, 268 (1985) (“[T]he basic principles of contract law [are] protecting the parties‟ intent while permitting maximum freedom
of contract.”). This idea is similar to the ability of a corporation to buy back outstanding
shares at a predetermined rate. See, e.g., Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d
1311, 1313 (N.Y. 1989) (upholding a buy-back agreement which could be exercised without
cause).
206
See Ingle, 535 N.E.2d at 1312 (stating the agreement allowed corporation to buy back
stock from employee if that employee ceased to be employed by corporation “for any reason”).
207
James P. McAndrews et al., A Practical Guide to Reviewing a Commercial Lease, 19
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 891, 929 (1984) (stating landlords do not want vacant buildings
and are willing to provide renewal options to prevent such an outcome “provided adequate
provisions are made” to protect a landlord‟s financial interests).
208
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 487-91 (Read, J., concurring); id. at 491-94
(Graffeo, J., dissenting).
209
Id. at 489-90 (Read, J., concurring); id. at 492 (Graffeo, J., dissenting).
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that renewal options were exempt from RAP under the common
law.210 However, all of the judges agree that the purpose of RAP has
always been to promote alienability and the development of property.211 In this respect the majority opinion remains sound.212
1.

The Concurring Opinion‟s Flaws

A flaw in Judge Read‟s concurring opinion, however, leads to
an unraveling of her argument. The judge relies upon distinguishing
perpetual renewal options from options which have a definite end
date.213 To further this point she cites to an article by Professor William Berg, who equates a perpetual renewal option with a fee simple
estate.214 While she never equivocally states so, Judge Read offers
substantial evidence to suggest that a perpetual renewal option would
be found valid under RAP and that she would have held the option at
bar valid had it been an option in perpetuity.215
There are faults in equating a perpetual renewal option with
fee simple ownership. In Berg‟s article, which Judge Read uses as
authority, he conditions the option‟s “fee simple” status on the expectation that “the value of the land does not drop to the point where the
rental becomes prohibitive.”216 Such a situation, Berg claims, would
cause the rent to become unreasonable and the tenant would likely
decide against exercising his renewal right.217 The problem with a
fee simple comparison thus becomes apparent: a true fee simple ownership right cannot be harmed by fluctuations in the price of real estate whereas the interest in a renewal option hinges on comparative
210
Id. at 493 (Graffeo, J., dissenting) (“[T]he early twentieth century decisions that the
majority relies on were grounded on the absence of a statutory prohibition that applied to
perpetual leases.”).
211
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 485 (majority opinion); id. at 488 (Read, J.,
concurring); id. at 492 (Graffeo, J., dissenting).
212
See discussion supra detailing how renewal options are beneficial not only for landlords and tenants, but also for the surrounding community.
213
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 488 (Read, J., concurring) (“[T]he common
law enforced „perpetual options to renew leases.‟ ”) (quoting majority opinion at 486).
214
Id. at 488 (Read, J., concurring).
215
Id. at 488-89, 490. This hypothesis is based on her extensive reliance on Berg, supra
note 144 and W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 638 (1938), as
authorities, both of which state that perpetual renewal options were exempt from RAP under
the common law. Id.
216
Id. at 488 (citing Berg, supra note 144, at 22).
217
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 488 (Read, J., concurring).
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market flows.218 For example, if property values drastically drop to
half of the original value, the landlord‟s ownership rights remain the
same; he is still the owner of the property. Yet, the tenant‟s interest in
a lease renewal plunges because it is based on the previous land market. The holder has a better chance of finding a new space at a much
lower rate than the one stipulated in the renewal because of the
change in market conditions. Thus, the tenant‟s interests are severely
disadvantaged while the landlord‟s rights remain intact; the parties
are not equally situated.
Furthermore, when Berg wrote his article in 1949, significant real
estate market drops were not a foreseeable possibility.219 However,
in the twenty-first century, we have seen drastic declines in property
values in a relatively short period,220 making such a condition much
more likely than it was in Berg‟s time.
Therefore, the reality is that perpetual options also include the
possibility that the option will terminate if the tenant fails to exercise
his right, and such a situation is more likely to occur during our current economic condition or a comparable depressed period.221 Thus,
a perpetual option and a renewal option with a stated end date are not
as distinct as Judge Read suggests. One must think of the phrase,
“[n]othing lasts forever”–and that maxim includes “perpetual” options.222

218
Neil Z. Auerbach, A Transactional Approach to Lease Analysis, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV.
309, 352 (1985) (stating that the lower the renewal rate compared to the current fair rental
value, the greater the economic benefit on the option holder).
219
See Kevin Drum, Chart of the Day: Housing Prices Since WWII, MOTHER JONES (Aug.
24 2010 1:23 PM), http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2010/08/chart-day-housing-priceswwii (“[I]f you look at a fifty-year period after World War II, home prices were absolutely
steady.”).
220
See Calculated Risk, Summary for Week Ending December 30th, CALCULATED RISK:
FINANCE
AND
ECONOMICS
(Dec.
31,
2011
9:00
AM),
http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2011_12_01_archive.html (“Nineteen of the 20 cities
covered by the indices . . . saw home prices decrease over the month. The 10- and 20-City
composites posted annual returns of -3.0% and -3.4% versus October 2010, respectively.”)
221
Furthermore, during any era, a perpetual option can also be terminated if the tenant
fails to exercise his right (or give notice to the landlord of his intent) to renew according to
the terms of the lease.
222
See Voyles v. Sasser, 472 S.E.2d 80, 81-82 (Ga. 1996) (giving credence to deposition
testimony that contracting parties never discussed duration and “nothing lasts forever”).
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The Dissenting Opinion‟s Criticism and the Potential
to Alleviate Those Concerns

Judge Graffeo also criticizes the majority‟s claim that renewal
options are “inherently appurtenant to the lease.”223 She reminds the
majority that one of the requirements for an appurtenant option is that
the option must originate in the lease.224 She then provides the example that an option agreement can be executed in a document completely separate from the lease agreement, perhaps even years after
the lease has been in effect.225 Not only does Judge Graffeo‟s scenario indicate that a renewal option can originate outside the lease, but
she also demonstrates that it could be exercised after its expiration.226
When a renewal option is included in a separate agreement, it may
not be subject to the time restraints of the lease.227 Therefore, contrary to the statements by the majority, it appears that a renewal option may violate all three requirements for the appurtenant exemption
as articulated in Symphony Space.228
A court may adopt several interpretations that would not allow a renewal option to become exercisable after the termination of
the lease. First, the court could find that when the lease term ends so
does the option to renew, regardless of a provision for an extended
date for the tenant to exercise the option.229 This interpretation would
not only mean that a renewal option could not be exercised after the
lease expires, but also that it could be connected to the intention of
the parties.230 The parties could not intend for there to be a renewal
after termination; such a situation would not constitute a renewal, but
223
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 494 (Graffeo, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion) (internal quotation mark omitted).
224
Id. at 493.
225
Id. at 493-94.
226
Id.
227
Id. at 494 (“[I]t could be drafted so that the ability to exercise the option is independent
from the lease . . . .”).
228
See Warren St. Assocs. v. City Hall Tower Corp., 608 N.Y.S.2d 429, 430 (App. Div.
1994) (holding six twenty-five year renewal options failed the appurtenant test because they
could be exercised after the lease expired); Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 806.
229
Simons v. Young, 155 Cal. Rptr. 460, 466 (Ct. App. 1979) (holding that option to renew billboard lease expired with the lease even though the agreement stipulated renewal
could be exercised three months after lease expiration because it would be “nonsensical” for
a lease to be “ „renewed‟ after it had expired”).
230
Id. (stating expiration of renewal with the lease furthers the intent of the parties because all other rights, including the right of possession, expire with the lease).
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rather a creation of a new lease.231 Alternatively, the majority claims
that any option that allows the tenant to exercise an option after forfeiting possession is an option to enter into a new lease.232 However,
the former interpretation is more logical as a person generally renews
before term expiration.233
A second interpretation to prevent the exercise of options after the lease expires is that upon expiration of the lease term, an unexercised option to renew is converted into an option to create a new
lease under the specified terms.234 Certainly, this approach resolves
the problem of creating options exercisable after the lease term, but it
also can create new difficulties in practice.235 For example, it would
be possible for the original tenant to exercise an option after removal
from possession and a new tenant is in place.236 Regardless of its
negative effects, however, these two interpretations would help correct the majority‟s statement that renewal options are inherently appurtenant. This is especially true if these alternative interpretations
are coupled with a requirement that the option to renew either be
created with the lease or subsequently added to the lease.237 In this
situation, based on the analysis in Symphony Space, renewal options
would always be appurtenant.238
An examination of the majority‟s decision reveals that it disregarded the court‟s analysis of the appurtenant exemption in Symphony Space.239 The majority expressly states that if a renewal option
231
See Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 487 (majority opinion) (stating that an
option exercised by a former tenant is an option to enter into a new lease, not a renewal option).
232
Id. (responding to the dissent‟s arguments that the holding allows a former tenant to
exercise a renewal right after the lease expires).
233
This is true in all facets of life, not only in the landlord-tenant context. For example, a
customer does not pay utility bills only after the electricity is turned off, nor does a driver
purchase gas only after the car has stopped running.
234
See Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 487 (“[A]n option exercisable by a former tenant no longer in possession is not a renewal option: it is an option to enter into a new
lease.”).
235
See id. at 493-94 (Read, J., dissenting).
236
Id.
237
See Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 806 (stating one of the elements of the appurtenant exemption is that the option “is incapable of separation from the lease”).
238
Id.
239
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 487 (“[A]n option to renew a lease (1) is
exercisable pursuant to the lease agreement and [is], thus, inherently appurtenant to the
lease . . . .”).
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is pursuant to the lease, then it is appurtenant.240 Therefore, the majority concludes that since all renewal options are in furtherance of
their respective leases, they are appurtenant.241 But, this description
takes into account none of the elements of the Symphony Space appurtenant exemption.242 Perhaps what the majority meant to articulate was that a renewal option is always connected to and in furtherance of the greater landlord-tenant relationship, thus, using the term
appurtenant in its broader non-legal context.243 Alternatively, though
less plausible, the statement could connote an even broader definition
of the appurtenant exemption, furthering limiting New York‟s statutory RAP law.244
D.

An Alternate Rationale

Even with the flaws mentioned by the concurring and dissenting opinions, the majority opinion provides the most promising outcome not only because of the benefits for landlords, tenants, and the
community, but also due to its furtherance of the common law public
policy.245 Since long before the days of King Henry VIII, there has
been a battle between landowners and courts regarding the control of
property and the validity of long-term restrictions and future interests.246 Since RAP‟s premiere in The Duke of Norfolk’s Case, its
purpose has been to promote the development of land and facilitate
alienability.247 While the majority‟s authorities and reasoning may be
faulty and unclear, the underlying argument is undeniably true–
renewal options inherently further the common law purpose (and
therefore New York‟s statutory purpose) of RAP.248
240

Id.
Id.
242
Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 806.
243
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 67 (Robert B. Costello et al., 3d ed.
1997) defines appurtenance as “[s]omething added to a more important thing; an appendage.”
244
See Lance Liebman, Forward: The New Estates, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 819, 825 n.31
(1997) (expressing surprise that the Court of Appeals failed “to adapt [RAP] to modern conditions” by not exempting commercial options from RAP in Symphony Space).
245
See generally Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d 484.
246
See Haskins, supra note 6, at 27-29 (discussing the strain between judges seeking
“freely alienable” land and landowners attempting long-term dead hand control).
247
Id. at 20.
248
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 487.
241
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In its opinion, the majority should have focused more on the
public policy reasons for exempting renewal options from RAP as
opposed to discussing the appurtenant exemption.249 While the court
briefly mentioned the benefits which accrue to landlords by the renewal option immunity, it did not discuss the advantages to the tenant
and, more importantly, the community.250 Furthermore, the majority
would have strengthened its argument by discussing the parallels between the public policy reasons for exempting commercial preemptive rights in Bruken and exempting all renewal options in Bleecker
Street.251 Lastly, because this case revolved around the statutory interpretation of New York RAP, the court was correct to briefly describe the legislative intent to exempt renewal options in the drafting
of the statute.252 The problem with Judge Jones‟s consideration of
this point is his discussion of the exemption of perpetual renewal options under the common law without explaining why that equates to
an exemption of all renewal options under the statute.253 However,
this gap could have been bridged by a simple deduction. If subject to
RAP, perpetual renewal options are potentially the most egregious
violators of the lives in being plus twenty-one year statutory (and
common law) period.254 If such options are exempt, then clearly, a
renewal option which violates RAP by a shorter time period should
be included in the exemption. With these modifications and focus,
the majority opinion would have been more persuasive in arguing for
exempting renewal options and would have quelled some of the concerns of the concurring and dissenting opinions.255
249

See generally id.
See id. These arguments were made by Tenant in its brief. Brief for DefendantAppellants, supra note 105, at *15.
251
Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at 383 (stating that any hindrance to alienability caused by the
right is “properly offset by [its] utility in modern legal transactions . . . .”).
252
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 487 (claiming that because perpetual renewal options were exempt from RAP under the common law, and the New York statute codifies
the common law, renewal options should be exempt in New York).
253
Id. at 486-87.
254
See Gleason v. Tompkins, 375 N.Y.S.2d 247, 252 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (perpetual is synonymous with “forever,” “for all time[],” and “everlasting,” clearly in violation of lives in
being plus twenty-one years).
255
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 488-90 (Read, J., concurring) (arguing that
the majority only cites authorities that exempt perpetual options without any reasoning for
exempting all options and questioning the majority‟s claim that all renewal options are appurtenant); id. at 493-94 (Graffeo, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority‟s authorities are
faulty and providing examples of renewal options that would not be appurtenant). Neither
250
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Additionally, courts should not take on the tedious task of determining whether RAP is violated and then perhaps applying the appurtenant exemption test when the only reason for doing so is the
mere existence of the common law rule.256 As the common law has
adapted to the ever changing modern era, courts have become more
reasonable in their application to ensure outcomes that are more fair
and beneficial, not only to the parties but also to the public.257 The
court‟s decision in Bleecker Street simply furthers the development
of the common law to promote modern transactions.258
E.

RAP’s Continued Place in New York Law

Although the court found that RAP should not be applied to
renewal options, RAP still has its importance in other areas of law.259
Just like commercial and governmental preemptive rights, renewal
options are part of a niche group of property rights where the nonenforcement of RAP actually furthers the policy reasons RAP was intended to promote.260 Alternatively, exempting the distribution of
property from RAP would yield a contrary result.261 Clearly, the
common law purpose to promote alienability of property would be
violated.262 Additionally, transferors or testators could then restrict
the sale or transfer of property in perpetuity, resulting in a smaller in-

the concurring opinion nor the dissenting opinion suggests that applying RAP to renewal
options is beneficial for public policy purposes or claims that the majority‟s discussion of
public policy is flawed. See generally id.
256
Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 806 (stating that some options further the public
policy objectives of common law RAP).
257
See, e.g., id. (holding appurtenant options to purchase are exempt from RAP); Bruken,
492 N.E.2d at 384 (holding RAP does not apply to preemptive rights in commercial or governmental transactions).
258
See Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 806 (holding RAP does not apply to purchase
options that meet the appurtenant exemption); Wildenstein & Co., 595 N.E.2d at 833 (stating
RAP does not apply to personal property interests in commercial transactions); Bruken, 492
N.E.2d at 384 (holding RAP does not apply to commercial and governmental preemptive
rights).
259
Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 806 (voiding purchase option under RAP in part
because it deters development of the land); id. at 808 (rejecting the “wait and see” approach
to RAP in part because of RAP‟s importance in the area of wills).
260
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 487.
261
Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at 381 (RAP was intended to “restrict family dispositions” that
created “embarrassing impediments to alienability”).
262
Id.
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centive for current landowners to develop the property.263 This
would result because the landlord would have to wait a longer period
of time to recoup his investment considering that a sale of the property is no longer a viable option. Furthermore, the community would
also suffer due to this disincentive of development.264
Even with these negative results a number of states have abolished common law RAP by statute.265 Other states have created
new and separate rules that apply to the vesting of options.266 However, deciphering the potential results of such an extreme legislative
determination shows that it is not in the best interests of the parties or
the public.267 Rather, with the Bleecker Street, Bruken, Symphony
Space, and Wildenstein & Co., Inc. v. Wallis268 opinions, New York
has found an effective balance for when RAP should be applied and
when rights should be exempt. Together, these four decisions exempt
the rights that further the public policy of RAP as well as provide a
means for other types of rights to be exempted on an individual level
if it is found that they are appurtenant.269 Meanwhile, New York still
enforces RAP in situations in which non-enforcement would cause
broad public policy concerns.270
RAP has long been one of the most confusing and misinterpreted aspects of the law.271 Unfortunately for New York lawyers,
263
See, e.g., id. at 383-84 (reasoning that in only limited circumstances is the nonenforcement of RAP used to further the alienability of property).
264
Controlling Residential Stakes, supra note 181, at 170 (suggesting uncertainty lowers
incentive to invest).
265
Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities:
R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097, 2103 (May 2003) (“[A]t least fourteen
states and the District of Columbia have abolished a rule that has been in place for four centuries.”). These states include Florida, New Jersey, and Virginia. Id. at n.31.
266
Patricia Y. Reyhan, Perpetuities Perpetuated: Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola Properties, Inc., 60 ALB. L. REV. 1259, 1270-71 (1997) (citing a Massachusetts Law which gives
option holders a flat thirty year period to exercise their right, even if the express terms of the
option agreement go beyond that period).
267
See generally Lawrence W. Waggoner, Perpetuity Reform, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1718
(Aug. 1983) (discussing the negative effects of broad changes to RAP).
268
595 N.E.2d 828 (N.Y. 1992).
269
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 484; Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at
806; Wildenstein & Co., 595 N.E.2d at 833; Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at 384.
270
See, e.g., Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 806 (holding option that deterred development and was not appurtenant was void under RAP); Morrison, 556 N.E.2d at 646
(holding RAP applies to residential preemptive rights because “lives in being” and “twentyone years” become more relevant restrictions).
271
Haskins, supra note 6, at 20.
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the Bleecker Street decision does not help solve the complexity of
RAP as it applies to other rights.272 Therefore, it is likely that despite
the Bleecker Street decision, there will continue to be cases regarding
RAP, its misinterpretation, and the resulting unnecessary costs to
clients due to attorney confusion. Just nine months after the Bleecker
Street case, a decision was rendered in a case in which a landlord
failed to understand the application of RAP.273 The landlord was
seeking to avoid a very unprofitable ninety-nine year lease by using
RAP as an argument.274 In its decision, the court reminded plaintiff‟s
counsel that RAP only applies to future contingent rights, not vested
ones.275 Therefore, although Bleecker Street simplifies RAP as it pertains to renewal options (since no application is required), the decision does not promote a greater understanding of RAP as it applies in
other circumstances.276
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Bleecker Street decision is the most recent case by the
New York Court of Appeals that limits the reach of RAP to particular
contingent interests. Even though the majority opinion contained a
number of flaws, the public policy effects it has on parties‟ freedom
of contract, the benefits and protections to landlords and tenants, and
the advantages to the general community make the decision consistent with RAP‟s common law purpose of alienability of property.
The decision also allows the legal community to be more at ease
when drafting leases. Perhaps, in the future, the New York Court of
Appeals will exempt other interests from RAP, further reflecting the
court‟s and the public‟s interest in adapting RAP to coincide with
modern legal transactions. However, based on its focus on the common law and public interest concerns in this area, the court seems unlikely to create significant exemptions to RAP in the future.

272
273
274
275
276

Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 484 (limiting holding to renewal options).
U.T.O.S. Inc. v. DeBaron Associates LLC, 932 N.Y.S.2d 468 (Sup. Ct. 2011).
Id. at 469.
Id. at 470 (“Plaintiff‟s argument . . . is misplaced.”).
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 484.
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